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Abstract: This study focuses on growth, poverty and inequality in Rwanda. We take a broad 
perspective, in two respects. First, we consider a long time period so as to compare the current 
situation with the pre-war situation, allowing us to assess whether the recent successes can be 
attributed to a recovery from a very low post-war base or whether they mark ‘real’ progress. 
Second, we look beyond static measures of material welfare and study economic and social 
mobility as well as indicators of human development and subjective well-being. 
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1 Introduction 
After the disastrous period of violent conflict in the mid-1990s, Rwanda experienced steady 
economic growth. Over the period 2000-12, Rwanda’s real gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita grew at an average annual rate of about 5 per cent (World Bank 2013b). By 2005, GDP per 
capita reached its pre-war level, and by 2012, it was about 50 per cent greater than GDP per capita 
prior to the armed conflicts of the 1990s. This is shown in Figure 1, which also reveals that this 
post-war pattern of growth contrasts with a stagnation of GDP per capita in the 1980s.1 
Poverty was estimated as high as 70 per cent at the end of the armed conflicts (UNDP 2007). In 
1999/2000 it had fallen to 59 per cent, but then declined only slowly to 57 per cent in 2005 while 
inequality peaked, reaching a Gini coefficient of 0.52. Recent trends in poverty and inequality are, 
however, encouraging. The third Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV3) points 
to a poverty reduction of 12 percentage points compared to EICV2, from 57 per cent in 2005/06 
to 45 per cent in 2010/11, and a decrease in the Gini coefficient of inequality from 0.52 to 0.49 
(GoR 2012a).  
These figures indicate that Rwanda’s recent economic growth can be labelled pro-poor (Ravallion 
and Chen 2003). At the occasion of the release of EICV3, Paul Collier commented that Rwanda 
pulled off a rare ‘hat trick’ of rapid growth, sharp poverty reduction and reduced inequality, and 
called this achievement ‘deeply impressive’.2 Furthermore, Christiaensen and Devarajan (2013) 
showcase Rwanda as an example of a resource-poor Sub-Saharan African country that achieves 
broad-based economic growth. 
Attempting to explain the sources of Rwanda’s economic success story, Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi (2012) stress the aspect of governance, arguing that Rwanda is a developmental 
authoritarian state that actively promotes private sector development and keeps the most 
detrimental forms of rent-seeking in check with ‘a set of arrangements for managing economic 
rents in a centralized way and deploying them with a view to the long term’ (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi 2012: 9).  
Others have argued that post-war catch-up may play a role—that is, the recovery from a post-war 
low to a (new) steady state growth path (Guariso and Verpoorten 2013a; Serneels and Verpoorten 
2013). Guariso and Verpoorten (2013a), studying data from three consecutive coffee censuses, 
show that in 1999 and 2003, farmers in highly war-affected regions invested little in new trees and 
in the maintenance of existing trees compared to farmers in less affected regions. By 2009—fifteen 
years after the 1994 genocide—the gap had closed, indicating considerable post-war catch-up at 
the farm level in the period 2003-09.  
In an analysis of the specific determinants of growth drawing on data from three consecutive 
nationwide household surveys (EICV1, 1999/2000, EICV2, 2005/6 and EICV3, 2010/11), the 
World Bank (2013a) stresses the role of non-farm self-employment in rural areas, effective 
productivity-enhancing measures in agriculture (such as the increased use of fertilizer), increased 
commercialization of agricultural output and the entry into the last phase of the demographic 
transition. The study further points out that the decline in inequality is driven by relatively strong 
                                                 
1 Other indicators improved in the course of the 1980s. For instance, child mortality decreased from 213 deaths per 
1,000 live births in 1980 to 156 in 1990 (World Bank 2013b).  
2 ‘A Roaring Economic Engine’, The Independent, 21 February 2012. Available at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201202220765 (accessed July 2013). 
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consumption growth of the poorest 20 per cent of Rwandans, which in its turn is attributed to the 
implementation of the second poverty reduction strategy that puts an emphasis on reducing 
extreme poverty, through investments in agriculture and social protection. 
Although the sources of growth need further investigation, at this point it would be safe to say 
that several factors are likely to play a role in the Rwandan success story: massive aid; increased 
budget shares for health, education and agriculture; the fertility transition; post-war catch-up; and 
yes—also the rise in international commodity prices. Over the period 2003-11, the world market 
price for coffee increased by 427 per cent, driving up producer prices for the estimated 500,000 
coffee farmers, as well as export earnings of Rwanda’s number one export product—from US$15 
million in 2003 to US$52 million in 2011 (Guariso et al. 2012).  
Many studies have looked at specific sectors that feature in the success story. Guariso et al. (2012) 
discuss the transformation of the Rwandan coffee sector; Ayalew et al. (2011) study the impact of 
land tenure regularization on investment, maintenance of soil conservation measures, and 
women’s land access; Basinga et al. (2010) study the impact of the introduction of performance-
based financing in the healthcare sector; Nkurunziza et al. (2012) analyse the introduction of free 
primary education; Saksena et al. (2011) study the introduction of mutual health insurance; and 
Westoff (2012) as well as Kabano et al. (2013) and Muhoza et al. (2013) look at the fertility 
transition.  
We could add many more papers to this list because research papers on Rwanda have multiplied, 
trying to keep up with the ever-growing list of policy measures, including among others the 1999 
new inheritance law that grants equal rights to male and female children, the new constitution of 
2003 that introduces gender quotas at all levels of decision-making and free and mandatory primary 
education, the introduction of performance-based financing for healthcare centres in 2006 as well 
as performance contracts between each district and the central government (Imihigo), an intense 
family planning campaign in 2007, and mandatory health insurance in 2008. 
Despite the large literature on Rwanda, several questions remain. Does the recent poverty and 
inequality reduction represent a true reversal of a trend? How can the data be reconciled with 
contrasting findings from qualitative fieldwork at the local level? Can economic growth continue 
to outpace population growth? Can development in Rwanda be sustained if the country continues 
to score very low on voice and accountability? This paper focuses on the first two questions. The 
latter two questions cannot, however, be left untouched (because they are central to understanding 
the collapse of Rwanda in the 1990s). We will briefly discuss them at the end of this paper. 
The decline in poverty and inequality came to the surprise and even disbelief of some of the 
regime’s critics. Part of the disbelief stems from the observation that the EICV3 data ‘contradict 
all field research conducted at the local level during the past years’ (Reyntjens 2012: 115). For 
instance, Sommers (2012)—in his book Stuck which is based on intensive qualitative fieldwork —
paints a very bleak outlook for the Rwandan society, in particular its youth. Furthermore, Ansoms 
(2011) criticizes the ‘social engineering of the rural sector’ which is said to leave ‘little room for 
traditional smallholder agriculture’ (Ansoms 2011: 240). She argues that ‘The elite push for rapid 
modernization and “professionalization” of the agricultural sector risks increasing both poverty 
and inequality’ (Ansoms 2011: 248). Especially the land consolidation and crop intensification 
policies (involving mono-cropping and regional crop specialization) are heavily criticized for 
threatening to undermine agricultural productivity and food security (Ansoms et al. 2010; Higgins 
2009). The villagization policy is also said to have ‘reduced economic security and quality of life’ 
(Newbury 2011: 235).  
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Indeed, this critical body of literature does not align well with the success story that emerges from 
the most recent data. For instance, it is difficult to reconcile the fierce criticism of the agricultural 
and land policies of the Government of Rwanda with the recent figures showing rural poverty 
reduction and a boom in agricultural production; rural headcount poverty is estimated to have 
declined from 62 per cent to 49 per cent over the period 2005/06 to 2010/11, and the production 
of cereals, pulses and roots is reported to have increased by 135 per cent, 21 per cent and 95 per 
cent, respectively (GoR 2012a; World Bank 2013a). Trying to reconcile both worlds, Reyntjens 
(Reyntjens 2012: 115) argues that ‘the consumption figures are a snapshot that might be 
determined by the output, strongly influenced by climate, of the agricultural season preceding the 
survey’. There may be some ground for this argument as total annual rainfall in 2010 was 50 per 
cent higher than in 2005 (1200 mm compared to 800 mm) (SSEE 2011). 
On the other hand, if part of the rural growth would be due to a good agricultural season in 
2010/11, the puzzle remains, because Rwanda also made great strides in other development 
indicators that are much less prone to weather fluctuations. For instance, the net attendance ratio 
(NAR) for primary schooling as measured by the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 
increased from 72 per cent in 2000 to 87 per cent in 2010. Over the same period deliveries at a 
healthcare facility (of life births in the last three years preceding the survey) tripled from 26 per 
cent to 78 per cent.  
One could still argue that these improvements reflect the ‘cosmetic upgrading of rural life’, which 
‘hides the true extent of poverty and inequality’ (Ansoms 2011: 247). This criticism is based on the 
coercion that accompanies many of the developmental measures, institutionalized in a system of 
fines—for not sending children to school, for walking barefoot or for consulting a traditional 
healer without authorization, among others (Ingelaere 2011).3 Ingelaere argues that these fines may 
make rural dwellers ‘look’ less poor, even though they are likely to ‘be and feel’ as poor, or even 
poorer, as before (Ingelaere 2011: 73). Regarding the performance-based financing of health 
services, Kalk et al. (2010) argue that the sticks and carrots that are designed to increase the use of 
health services may lead to a quantity-quality trade-off.4 
It is possible that Rwandans adapt their behaviour, or their survey responses, to the public 
discourse; and the existence of a quantity-quality trade-off in both health and education is also 
plausible. However, even if authoritarian implementation and public transcripts account for part 
of the progress observed, the progress clearly goes beyond cosmetic upgrading.5 For instance, the 
sharp increase in deliveries at a health facility is accompanied by an equally impressive decrease in 
maternal mortality from 1071 in 2000 to 476 in 2010; and the suddenly sharp decrease in the 
reported ideal number of children (from 4.3 in 2005 to 3.3 in 2007)—even though clearly 
responsive to the 2007 three children campaign—is matched by an equally impressive decline in 
actual fertility (see below).  
But maybe these trends can be attributed to catch-up from a very low base after the devastating 
armed conflicts? In Section 2 of this paper, we show that even though catch-up plays a role, the 
recent strides made in health and educational outcomes represent genuine progress that exceeds 
                                                 
3 Following criticism of the fines by donors (and by the Rwandan population), their actual implementation may have 
decreased in recent years (personal correspondence with Ingelaere). 
4 More precisely, Kalk et al. (2010) point to the risks of a ‛crowding-out’ effect (diminishing or erasing of intrinsic 
motivation due to external rewards) and ‘gaming’ (too much focus on indicators that are in the system thereby 
neglecting non-rewarded indicators or falsification of results to maximize reward). 
5 The claim that ‘the progress goes beyond cosmetic upgrading’ is based on the assumption that the EICV and DHS 
data have not been manipulated by the government bodies involved in their collection.  
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pre-war levels. Relying on five waves of DHS data across the period 1992–2010, we also show that 
overall these recent strides represent inclusive development, reducing the gap between poor and 
rich. Section 2 therefore concludes that, while there is evidence for the use of coercion in the 
implementation of measures, raising concern that some of the progress may pick up ‘cosmetic’ 
rather than ‘real’ changes, there is also robust evidence for real improvements in quality of life 
measures. 
These findings need not indicate that the largely pessimistic conclusions of much of the qualitative 
field research conducted at the local level are wrong. Even when many development indicators are 
on the rise, and inequality declines, one may still feel more poor because of the presence of 
coercion, the lack of voice and accountability, and rapid social transformation that leads to winners 
and losers (in absolute or relative terms).  
To illustrate this point, Section 3 turns to an analysis of economic mobility, social mobility and 
happiness. Relying on a small panel dataset of households interviewed in 2000 and 2008, the 
analysis reveals a great deal of movement of households up and down the income distribution, 
much less movement across social categories, and a strong correlation of mobility with subjective 
well-being. In contrast, income levels are uncorrelated with happiness. Land ownership, on the 
other hand, emerges as a factor that strongly correlates with income and social mobility, and as the 
single most determining factor for social categories and happiness. Section 3 therefore concludes 
that there may be a mismatch between subjective measures of well-being and static measures of 
material welfare, especially in a context of rapid transformative changes that leads to winners and 
losers (in relative terms) and affects the traditional land-based livelihoods.  
In Section 4 we discuss our main findings, point to directions for future research, and reflect on 
the two remaining questions raised in this introduction: Can economic growth continue to outpace 
population growth? Can development in Rwanda be sustained if the country continues to score 
very low on voice and accountability?  
2 A true reversal in trend? An analysis of Rwandan DHS data, 1992–2010 
Exploiting five rounds of DHS data, this section paints a picture of past and current trends in 
human development. Taking a long time perspective allows assessment of whether the recent 
successes can be attributed to a recovery from a very low post-war base or whether they mark real 
progress. Besides average time trends of human development indicators, we present the 
heterogeneity in these trends across wealth quintiles and across space. 
2.1 Data 
So far, Rwanda has implemented five DHS surveys: in 1992, 2000, 2005, 2007 and 2010. The first 
two surveys bracket a period of armed conflicts, namely the 1991–94 civil war, the 1994 genocide, 
and the 1994–98 refugee crisis and (counter-)insurgency operations. The more recent surveys were 
implemented in a period in which various government interventions took place, most importantly 
performance-based financing (PBF) of health services, performance contracts between each 
district and the central government (Imihigo), the introduction of obligatory health insurance, an 
increase in the share of government expenditures for the health sector, the introduction of free 
primary education, an intensive family planning campaign and the promotion of gender equality. 
Figure 2 gives a timeline of important events and DHS survey rounds.  
The questionnaire design is broadly similar across the survey rounds, but the 2007 round only 
enquired about a limited number of indicators, leaving out for instance educational attainment. 
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The first four surveys were designed to be representative at the level of the 12 provinces (in place 
before the 2006 administrative reform), while the latest survey is representative at the level of the 
33 districts (which were created during the administrative reform). Our analysis accounts for the 
DHS survey design, and population weights are used as recommended by the data providers.  
2.2 Average time trends in selected indicators 
We present an overview of trends in indicators belonging to the following broad categories: 
housing characteristics and ownership of durable goods, fertility and reproductive health, other 
health outcomes, and education. Tables 1 to 4 provide summary statistics.   
Housing characteristics and ownership of durable goods 
For two housing characteristics the answer categories are comparable across the survey rounds: 
electricity in the home and the construction material of the floor. Both indicators improved over 
time, especially across the latest three rounds (2005, 2007 and 2010). In 2010, 9.7 per cent of 
households had electricity in their home, up from 4.8 per cent in 2005, and 2.3 per cent in 1992. In 
2010, 16.9 per cent of households had a finished floor (instead of earth or sand), compared to 13.0 
per cent in 2005 and 11.0 per cent in 1992. 
Household ownership of durable goods also increased over time, with 62.6 per cent of households 
owning a radio in 2010, compared to 32.3 per cent in 1992. Likewise, bike ownership almost 
doubled over the period 1992–2010, from 6.4 per cent to 15.2 per cent. The ownerships of a 
television, motorcycle or private car also increased, but remained low in 2010, at 5.3 per cent, 1.1 
per cent and 0.8 per cent, respectively.  
Fertility and reproductive health 
Fertility declined from 6.2 in 1992 to 4.6 in 2010. Most of the change occurred during the periods 
2005-07 and 2007-10. In contrast, between 1992 and 2005, fertility hardly declined.6  
In line with declining fertility over the period 2005-10, there was a marked increase in the use of 
contraceptives. For instance, the use of modern contraceptives increased from 10.3 per cent in 
2005 to 45.1 per cent in 2010. At the same time, the unmet need for contraceptives declined 
considerably, from 37.9 per cent in 2005 to 20.8 per cent in 2010.  
Delivery at a health facility (instead of at home) increased impressively, from below 30 per cent in 
and prior to 2005 to almost 80 per cent in 2010. Less than 40 per cent of deliveries were assisted 
by trained medical staff in and prior to 2005, compared to almost 70 per cent of deliveries in 2010. 
The maternal mortality ratio remains high in Rwanda, although it shows a steady decline over the 
period 2000-10. It stood at 476 deaths per 100,000 live births in the 2010 DHS, down from 750 
in 2005, and 1,071 in 2000. 
Other health outcomes 
The infant mortality rate, as calculated from the five-year period preceding the survey, dropped 
from 83 in 2005 to 50 in 2010. In contrast, during the period of armed conflict, infant mortality 
increased from 85 in 1992 to 109 in 2000. Similarly, the under-five mortality rate increased between 
                                                 
6 Schindler and Brück (2011) attribute this status quo to the war and genocide in the 1990s.  
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1992 and 2000, from 151 to 196, but declined in the subsequent periods, to 152 in 2005, 103 in 
2007 and 76 in 2010.  
The decline in infant and under-five mortality went hand in hand with improvements in other 
child health outcomes. For instance, child nutritional indicators improved, with stunting and 
wasting decreasing over the period 2005-10. The prevalence of diarrhoea and fever for children 
under five years old in the two weeks preceding the survey also decreased.  
The decrease in child mortality and illness may reflect a better outreach of basic preventive 
healthcare measures. As such, vaccination coverage and bed net ownership increased. Vaccination 
coverage was already high in 1992 at 86.3 per cent, but then declined to 76.0 per cent in 2000 and 
further to 75.2 per cent in 2005, most likely because of violent conflicts. By 2010, vaccination rates 
had recovered, reaching 90.1 per cent. Only 6.6 per cent of households owned a bed net in 2000, 
but this share steadily increased to 18.2 per cent in 2005, 59.2 per cent in 2007 and 82.7 per cent 
in 2010.7  
Education 
Educational attainment improved over time. The share of males (aged six or older) with no formal 
education decreased from 29.4 per cent in 1992 to 24.9 per cent in 2000, to 19.4 per cent in 2005 
and 13.0 per cent in 2010. The corresponding figures for females are 40.4 per cent, 32.6 per cent, 
27.7 per cent and 20.2 per cent. The mean years of education of the active population (aged 15-
65) increased from 3.9 in 1992 to 4.6 in 2010 for males, and from 3.0 in 1992 to 4.0 in 2010 for 
females.  
The NAR for primary school increased over the period 1991–2000 from 61.5 to 72.0, despite the 
violent conflicts.8 In 2005 it stood at 80.1 to increase further to 87.5 in 2010. The NAR for 
secondary school dropped from 5.7 in 1992 to 5.0 in 2000, because violence caused slow progress 
through primary school delaying secondary school initiation, but also because violence reduced 
enrolment in secondary school (Akresh and de Walque 2008; Guariso and Verpoorten 2013b). It 
dropped further to 4.0 in 2005, but more than recovered by 2010, when it reached 14.4. The figures 
are very similar for boys and girls.  
Gross attendance ratios (GAR)9 for primary school increased greatly from 84.6 in 1992 to around 
100 in 2000, close to 130 in 2005, and to approximately 140 in 2010. These figures indicate that a 
large share of overage children enrolled in primary school, a result of slow grade progression during 
armed conflict, which is further explained in Appendix 1. The GAR for secondary school 
decreased from 16.6 in 1992 to 7.9 in 2000, but then recovered to 8.2 in 2005 and further to 26.1 
in 2010. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The ownership of bed nets was not recorded in 1992. 
8 NAR indicates participation in schooling among those of official school age, which is age 6-11 for primary school 
and 12-17 for secondary school (DHS various years).  
9 GAR indicates school attendance among young people of any age, from age 5 to 24, and is expressed as a percentage 
of the school age population for that level of schooling (DHS various years). 
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2.3 Heterogeneity in the indicators 
Health and education across wealth quintiles 
To investigate whether there is an improvement in healthcare for the poorest households and 
increased access to education, we study how health and education relate to proxies of permanent 
household income, and whether this relation changes over time. Lacking data on income in the 
DHS, we use a weighted sum of asset ownership and housing characteristics as a cue for household 
wealth, with the weights determined by principal component analysis, as proposed by Filmer and 
Pritchet (2001).10  
Figure 3 shows the time trends in eight human development indicators, depicting the averages for 
observations in the lowest (q1) and highest (q5) wealth quintiles. The lines show broadly similar 
trends for the bottom and top wealth quintiles. To determine inequality and whether there is 
convergence or divergence over time we calculate a simple measure—that is, the ratio of the 
indicator between the top and bottom wealth quintiles of the sample population.  
The results, given in Table 5, show that the disparity between the highest and lowest wealth 
quintiles is smallest and most stable over time for primary school enrolment and vaccination 
coverage. For the other indicators, the general pattern during the period of armed conflict (1992–
2000) is one of sharply increasing disparities. For instance, in 2000, deliveries at a healthcare facility 
were almost four times more likely among the wealthiest quintile than among the poorest, 
compared to only 2.1 times in 1992. Between 2000 and 2005 inequality decreased for all but one 
indicator (secondary NAR), but it remained far above the pre-war levels. It is only by 2007 that 
levels of disparity declined to reach pre-war levels. Disparities then further declined to reach even 
lower levels by 2010. 
Rural-urban gap and heterogeneity across provinces 
The trends in inequality in the selected indicators may stem from a divergence or convergence 
between urban and rural areas. Table 6 repeats Table 5, but now focusing on the distinction 
between urban and rural respondents. We observe basically the same pattern of rising disparity 
during the period of armed conflict (except for vaccination and primary NAR), followed by 
decreasing disparity in the post-war periods. By 2010, the rural-urban gap was lower than it was 
prior to the armed conflicts. Thus, part of the inequality trends of Table 5 relate to urban-rural 
divergence in the period 1992–2000 and urban-rural convergence in later periods. 
Although Rwanda is a small country, it is marked by considerable inter-province variation in 
altitude, rainfall and temperatures. In addition, as documented by Verpoorten (2012a) the different 
provinces experienced different forms of armed conflict and may therefore have experienced 
different trajectories in human development.11 Figure 4 visualizes the province-specific trajectories 
for the eight health and schooling indicators. In general we do not spot diverging trends across 
provinces, even when taking into account Kigali City. Although Kigali City performs better across 
                                                 
10 The resulting indices are given by Measure DHS for each round; and are constructed on the basis of a set of variables 
that vary across survey rounds. For instance, the 2005 and 2010 indices include information on mobile phone 
ownership, a variable that was only introduced in 2005. In addition, for some variables the answer categories varied 
between rounds, for example source of drinking water and type of toilet facilities. 
11 These provinces no longer exist as such. In 2002, an administrative reorganization replaced the 12 provinces with 
five regions. 
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the different indicators, the trend over time is one of convergence between the capital city and the 
rest, except for secondary NAR. 
Since close to 90 per cent of the Rwandan population is rural, we also investigate inter-province 
differences over time for the sub-sample of rural respondents. For this purpose, we regress the 
indicators of each DHS round separately on the full set of province dummies, using Rural Kigali 
as a base category (but excluding Kigali City). Appendix 2 shows the results. Gikongoro province 
lags behind, especially in the area of reproductive health and bed net ownership. The gap between 
the rural population of Gikongoro and the other provinces was highest in 2007 and reduced 
somewhat by 2010. Kibuye also has a relatively poor performance. It lags behind especially in the 
area of education, but this was already the case prior to the armed conflicts. There are no provinces 
which consistently score better than others throughout the entire period, although Gitarama 
experienced upward mobility in its relative performance. 
2.4 Summary of DHS analysis 
Most of the selected indicators improved substantially across the period 2000-10, mainly because 
of progress during the two latest sub-periods 2005-07 and 2007-10. During the sub-period 1992–
2000, bracketing violent conflicts, most of the indicators declined. The period shortly after the 
violence, 2000-05, is characterized by mixed patterns, with most of the indicators returning to their 
pre-war levels, or surpassing them, while others declined further compared to their pre-war levels.  
The indicators that declined further several years after the violence are stock variables, such as 
educational outcomes, for which the impact of a negative shock has a long shadow. In contrast, 
flow indicators such as the health condition of children in the two weeks prior to the survey 
(prevalence of cough, fever, diarrhoea) show a steady improvement over time, across all DHS 
rounds. 
Across the latest three DHS rounds, we noted converging trends across wealth quintiles, as well 
as decreasing disparities across rural and urban areas. The opposite patterns were observed across 
the first two DHS rounds, bracketing the period of armed conflicts. The different provinces 
displayed broadly similar trends, and the pattern that emerges is one of inter-province convergence 
rather than divergence. Although the performance of Kigali City stands out, the gap between the 
capital city and the rest seems to be decreasing over time. Gikongoro remains a province that is 
lagging behind somewhat, while Gitarama experienced upward mobility.  
While part of the improvements observed in the post-war period can be attributed to catch-up 
with pre-war levels, there is also real progress, as for all indicators considered the 2010 levels 
outperform the pre-war levels of 1992, and 2010 disparities are smaller than pre-war disparities.  
Our findings can be summarized in six highlights: 
– All welfare indicators considered improved across the period 1992–2010; 
– Progress took place mostly during the two latest sub-periods 2005–07 and 2007–
10; 
– During the period 1992–2000, bracketing violent conflicts, most of the indicators 
declined; 
– The disparities across wealth quintiles and across rural and urban areas decreased 
between 1992 and 2010; 
– During the period of armed conflicts (1992–2000) disparities increased sharply; 
– The general pattern is one of inter-province convergence in the selected indicators. 
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3 Household-level economic mobility, social mobility and happiness 
The dynamic and subjective dimensions of household well-being may not be unimportant in 
Rwanda given its violent history and profound social transformation. In this section, we analyse 
income growth, inequality and income mobility across the period 2002-08, in a small household 
panel dataset. Income mobility is triangulated against households’ self-reported social mobility 
experience and happiness. We give special attention to the role of land as a determinant of mobility 
and happiness.  
The panel dataset is not representative for the Rwandan rural population, not only because of its 
small size but also because the households were selected several years ago; they may therefore be 
at a particular stage in their life cycle.12 Therefore, this analysis is only a first step towards further 
insight into mobility and subjective well-being and results cannot be generalized to the Rwandan 
population. 
After giving an overview of the dataset and some key summary statistics, we turn to the analysis 
of economic mobility, social mobility and happiness. 
3.1 The panel dataset 
The panel dataset considered includes two rounds of data from surveys implemented in 2002 and 
2008 in two Rwandan provinces, Gikongoro and Gitarama. Figure 5 shows the location of the 
provinces and the selected household clusters.13 
The 2002 round was collected as part of a study for DGOS. It included 258 households; among 
which 160 households (ten clusters) in Gitarama province and 98 (six clusters) in Gikongoro 
province. The survey collected information on subsistence production, crop sales, livestock 
production, non-farm income, beer brewing, transfers, land ownership, household composition 
and schooling. Additionally, recall information was collected about war-related shocks, other 
adverse income shocks, and household consumption shortfalls, among others. 
The 2008 round was collected on a grant from the Rwandan government and LICOS (Center for 
Institutions and Economic Performance, University of Leuven). It relied on a survey design similar 
to that used in the previous round and set out to interview the 258 households who were 
interviewed in 2002. Four of the 258 households interviewed in 2002 could not be found, while 
13 households could not be considered as the same because all former household members had 
been replaced by distant family or by neighbours. In our panel data analysis, we consider the 241 
remaining households. Analysing attrition across the 2002 and 2008 rounds, we find little evidence 
that household characteristics drive attrition. Only the number of active members in a household 
turns up significant, which is very intuitive: the smaller the household size, the more likely that 
none of the original household members can be found.  
Among the 241 households, 176 were also interviewed in 1990 in what constituted the first round 
of the panel data. This is further explained in Appendix 3, which also presents summary statistics 
                                                 
12 In addition, the initial sampling comprised only rural households with landholdings, leaving out the landless. 
Furthermore, the sample neither includes so-called old caseload refugees—that is, Tutsi who fled Rwanda between 
1959 and 1990 and came back when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized power. 
13 In 2002, an administrative reorganization reduced the number of provinces from 12 to five. Gikongoro and 
Gitarama are located in what is now the Southern province. 
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for the 176 households across the three rounds. We do not include this round in our analysis below 
because we do not have information on social categories and happiness for the 1990 round.  
3.2 Summary statistics 
To get a sense of the extent of economic growth and inequality in the period 2002-08, we calculate 
income and asset ownership for the households in our sample (there are no data on expenditures). 
Appendix 4 details the method used for calculating income from the survey data. Table 7 shows a 
comparison of the levels of income, the income sources, land ownership, livestock and household 
composition across 2002 and 2008, focusing on the 241 households that were surveyed in both 
years.  
The summary statistics indicate strong income growth between 2002 and 2008, with real income 
per adult equivalent (in 2008 prices) increasing from Rwandan Franc (RWF)14 54,614 in 2002 to 
RWF 60,725 in 2008, corresponding to an 11.2 per cent increase over the six-year period. This 
income growth took place despite a sharp drop in average farm sizes from 0.89 ha in 2002 to 
0.54ºha in 2008. Livestock ownership, expressed in tropical livestock units (TLU), was very similar 
in both years.  
In terms of income composition, we note a decline in the share of own agricultural production 
(from 60.0 per cent to 56.7 per cent) and a rise in the contribution of non-farm wage employment 
(7.2 per cent to 7.6 per cent) and non-farm self-employment (9.4 per cent to 10.1 per cent). These 
changes are however small and insignificant. The moderate decline in the contribution of 
agricultural production, in spite of the substantial decline in land sizes, suggests that agricultural 
productivity increased; possibly through the increased use of fertilizer as highlighted by the World 
Bank (2013a), or—more trivially—by better agricultural weather conditions. 
The information on household composition in 2002 and 2008 indicates a decrease in the 
dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of dependent to active household members (from 121 to 
109). This could be related to the life cycle of households, with children growing older. The 
proportion of female-headed households is high in both years (above 45 per cent), which results 
from the large number of male casualties and prisoners15 as well as from the oversampling of 
genocide survivors (mainly widows) in 2002 (see Appendix 3 for details on sampling).  
The Gini coefficients show that income inequality is high at 0.57 but stable over the two years 
considered. While we observe a strong increase in land inequality (from 0.51 to 0.62), inequality of 
                                                 
14 Using a purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rate of 300, the corresponding amounts in US$ are US$182 and 
US$202. 
15 Three out of four households who lost a member owing to violence became female-headed, and seven out of ten 
households who had a member in prison in 2002 were female-headed. 
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livestock decreased (from 0.52 to 0.39).16 This is also clear from Figure 6, which gives the kernel 
densities17 for land and livestock in 2002 and 2008.  
3.3 Economic mobility, 2002-08 
Measuring mobility 
To obtain insight into the movement of households through the income distribution, we turn to 
an analysis of economic mobility. Economic mobility can be measured in different ways (Amiel 
and Bishop 2003). We present inter-temporal transition matrices and a measure of time 
dependence—that is, the extent to which a household’s current economic position is determined 
by its position in the past. The more the households move through the income distribution, the 
lower the time dependence.  
Table 8 shows quintile transition matrices for income, income per adult equivalent, land and 
livestock. The rows of the 5x5 matrices correspond to wealth quintiles of the base period while 
the columns represent the wealth quintiles of the final period. The entries in the transition matrix 
indicate the fractions of households in the base period quintile, which ended up in a certain final 
period quintile. Between brackets the absolute numbers are given. For example, cell (l,l) of Matrix 
A indicates that 28.6 per cent of households that belonged to the lowest income quintile in 2002 
remained in that quintile in 2008, whereas cell (1,5) indicates that 8.2 per cent of households in the 
lowest quintile in 2002 reached the top quintile in 2008. Economic mobility of the poorest is lower 
for asset ownership. Cell (1,1) in Matrix C indicates that 32.7 per cent of households in the smallest 
land quintile in 2002 remained in that quintile in 2008. For livestock, the cell (1,1) gives a share as 
high as 46.1 per cent (Matrix D). 
From the transition matrix, we calculate the immobility ratio. This is the fraction of households 
that remain in the same quintile over time—that is, the sum of the elements on the diagonal as a 
percentage of all households. We obtain an immobility ratio of approximately 26 per cent for 
income and income per adult equivalent, 27 per cent for land, and 34 per cent for livestock 
ownership. These results are comparable with the findings on time dependence of income and 
assets by other authors, although the immobility ratio for land is on the low side, suggesting that 
shifts in land ownership were relatively high in Rwanda across this period.18  
                                                 
16 It is tempting to attribute the decline in livestock inequality to the ‘one family-one cow’ policy that was launched in 
2006 (UNICEF 2011). Effective distribution of livestock started however only in 2010. Another conjecture, that better 
fits the time frame, is related to the scarcity of pasture land and restrictions on grazing cattle on common land. These 
constraints may have forced cattle owners to keep their cattle stabled, which is costly in terms of the investment in 
the stable and the labour time needed to feed and water the stabled cattle. The cattle owners may have therefore opted 
to share this burden as well as the fruits of livestock ownerships with households who owned fewer or no cattle 
(Verpoorten 2009; personal correspondence with Bert Ingelaere). 
17 Kernel density estimators approximate the density function f(x) from observations on x, giving the probability of 
observing xi (land or livestock of household i) in the sample. Consequently, the estimates of f(x) integrate to 1. As 
opposed to frequency tables, kernel density estimates have the advantage of being smooth and independent of the 
choice of origin. More formally, the data are divided into intervals and estimates of the density at the centre of the 
interval are produced. The intervals are allowed to overlap. The smoothness of the figure depends on the width of 
the interval chosen. 
18 For example, for India, Lanjouw and Stern (1991, 1993) found an income immobility ratio of 25.7 per cent over a 
twelve-year period. Using land ownership, Swaminathan (1991a, 1991b) found an immobility ratio of 48.2 per cent 
over eight years for a sample of Indian households. For a detailed overview of the results of mobility matrices, we 
refer to Baulch and Hoddinott (2000). 
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In order to control for mobility stemming from local weather variability and other community-
level characteristics, we use a regression analysis, regressing material welfare in 2008 on material 
welfare in 2002 and commune dummies (for the 16 clusters in our sample). The results presented 
in Table 9 show significant time dependence for all four material welfare indicators. For instance, 
the estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point higher income in 2002 is related to a 0.38 
percentage point higher income in 2008, and that a 1 percentage point higher livestock ownership 
in 2002 is associated with 0.43 percentage point higher TLU in 2008.  
A final illustration of time dependence is provided by Figure 7 which gives simple scatter plots 
with baseline wealth on the horizontal axis and end line wealth on the vertical axis. The fitted lines 
are upward sloping, indicating positive correlation of material wealth over time. 
Explaining mobility 
To explain income and income mobility, we take a production function approach, relating income 
to the production factors land, labour and schooling. In addition, we add an indicator variable that 
takes 1 for female-headed households, as women may face several constraints that reduce 
productivity, such as limited land tenure security or access to credit. To control for local weather 
shocks, we add commune fixed effects, ߤ௜. Our empirical equation can be written as follows: 
ܮ݋݃(ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁)௜௧
= ߙ଴ + ߙଵ݈݋݃	(݈ܽ݊݀)௜௧ + ߙଶ݈݋݃	(݈ܾܽ݋ݑݎ)௜௧ + ߙଷ݈݋݃	(ݏܿℎ݋݋݈݅݊݃)௜௧
+ ߙସ݂݈݁݉ܽ݁௜௧ + ߤ௜ + ߝ௜௧ 
Land of household i in year t is measured by the natural logarithm of the land area owned 
(expressed in ares),19 labour by the natural logarithm of household members aged 15 to 65, and 
schooling by the natural logarithm of the years of schooling of the household head.  
We estimate the equations separately for each year. Table 10 shows the results. The return to land 
is positive and strongly significant, with point estimates of 0.268 in 2002 and 0.355 in 2008. The 
return on labour is also positive and highly significant, at 0.838 in 2002 and 0.638 in 2008. The 
return to schooling of the household head is not significantly different from zero. Female-headed 
households perform markedly worse in 2002, which may reflect the shocks of war and genocide 
and their association with the death or imprisonment of male household heads. In 2008, their 
underperformance is no longer statistically significant.  
These estimates indicate that households that increased their production factors over time, are 
likely to have experienced income growth. This is made explicit in Panel C of Table 10, which 
shows the results of a regression of income in 2008 on income in 2002 and the changes in 
production factors between 2002 and 2008. 
ܮ݋݃(ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁)௜௧ାଵ
= ߚ଴ + ߚଵlog	(݅݊ܿ݋݉݁)௜௧
+ ∆௧,௧ାଵ(݈ܾܽ݋ݑݎ, ݈ܽ݊݀, ݏܿℎ݋݋݈݅݊݃, ݂݈݁݉ܽ݁௜) + μ′′௜ + ߝ′′௜௧ 
This regression is based on the following intuitive reasoning about mobility: a household’s income 
in t+1 is a function of its income in t and the change in production factors between t and t+1 
                                                 
19 Ares, the equivalent of 100 m2 or 0.01 ha. 
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(making abstraction of changes in productivity). We find that income in 2008 significantly depends 
on income in 2002 and on changes in labour and land between 2002 and 2008. 
Social categories and social mobility 
Survey measures of income are prone to measurement error, and may vary greatly from year to 
year depending on rainfall and other temporary shocks. Households’ perceptions of their social 
category and social mobility are less prone to such temporary fluctuations, and may therefore better 
reflect the households’ mobility experience.  
In 2008, households were asked to rank themselves in one of the six social categories that emerged 
from the 2001 nationwide participatory poverty assessment (Ubudehe) implemented nationwide in 
a sample of administrative sectors.20 The categories range from ‘the abject poor’ (Umutindi nyakujya) 
to ‘the money-rich’ (Umukire). The intermediate categories are ‘the very poor’, ‘the poor’, ‘the 
resourceful poor’, and ‘the food-rich’ (Umutindi, Umukene, Umukene wifashije, Umukungu, Umukire). 
These categories, joint with their main characteristics, are given in Table 11 (taken from GoR 
2002). 
Table 12 gives the distribution of our sample households across the different social categories for 
the survey years 2002 and 2008, with the distribution of 2002 based on recall information asked in 
2008. We find that both in 2002 and 2008 close to 3 per cent of the households in our sample self-
reported to be in the lowest social category. In 2002, we find about 13 per cent in the second 
category and 43 per cent in the third category, compared to 11 per cent and 37 per cent in 2008. 
While the lowest three categories make up almost 59 per cent of the sample in 2002, their share 
stands at 51 per cent in 2008, thus marking a decline in poverty. 
According to Howe and McKay (2007) the first two categories represent chronic poor in Rwanda, 
and chronic poverty is said to be characterized by no or very limited land and livestock ownership. 
We check whether the social categories indeed depend on the land, livestock and income base of 
the households. The results are given in Table 12 and in the box-and-whisker plots in Figure 8, 
and clearly show that the higher the self-reported social category, the higher income, income per 
adult equivalent, land ownership and livestock ownership, on average. Most strikingly, land 
ownership amounts to less than 0.2 ha in the lowest social category compared to over 1 ha in the 
two highest categories. 
Howe and McKay (2007) argue that the third and fourth categories are likely to include many 
transitory poor. We therefore expect mobility to be concentrated in categories three and four. 
Table 13 shows the mobility matrix across categories between 2002 and 2008. Whereas six out of 
the seven respondents in category 1 remained stuck in category 1, there is quite some upward 
mobility of the second and third categories to categories three and four, respectively. The overall 
immobility ratio is however very high at 70 per cent. This contrasts sharply with the low immobility 
ratios that we reported for income and assets.  
Regarding the reasons for income and asset mobility, we highlighted the role of production factors, 
but there may be many other determinants of mobility that go undetected in a production function 
approach. Each household was asked to list two reasons for its experience of social mobility. The 
                                                 
20 In each sector, facilitators consulted with a large number of community members (about 300), aiming to identify 
different social categories as seen by Rwandans themselves. The characteristics of these groupings were defined as 
well as the reasons for moving up or down the social ladder, and for being stuck in poverty (Niringiye and Ayebale 
2012). 
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wide variety of reasons is apparent from Figure 9, which summarizes the self-reported reasons for 
downward and upward social mobility during the period 2002-08. The top three reasons for both 
downward and upward mobility relate to land and agricultural production. Other frequently 
mentioned reasons relate to livestock, support from the authorities, better health and access to 
health. 
Happiness  
We derive the happiness of household heads interviewed in 2008 from the twelfth question of the 
GHQ-12, the General Health Questionnaire, developed by Goldberg and Blackwell (1970):21 
‘Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy all things considered?’. Respondents select their 
level of agreement using the following response categories: ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘disagree’ and 
‘strongly disagree’. We coded these responses as 4-3-2-1. 
Table 14 shows the distribution of the answers: about 10 per cent of household heads strongly 
agreed, 57 per cent agreed, 21 per cent disagreed and 12 per cent strongly disagreed. Clubbing 
together the two latter categories, we may conclude that close to one out of three household heads 
felt unhappy. Looking at the distribution of income, assets and mobility across the answer 
categories, we find happiness to be weakly correlated with income, but strongly correlated with 
income mobility (both measured and self-reported). Strikingly, even the unhappy experienced a 
positive income change (RWF +31,000 vs. RWF +85,000 for the happy), suggesting that it is not 
levels nor absolute changes in income that matter, but relative changes.  
Happiness also strongly correlated with land ownership. Those who report being happy have about 
75 per cent more land than ‘the unhappy’ (0.38 ha vs. 0.65 ha). Women tend to own less land, and 
report in general lower levels of happiness. We therefore verify whether the relationship between 
landholdings and happiness holds for the sub-sample of male household heads. The difference 
shrinks somewhat but remains significant when considering only male household heads (0.40 ha 
vs. 0.68 ha for ‘unhappy’ and ‘happy’ respectively). The average decline in landholdings was also 
larger among the unhappy than among the happy (0.53 ha vs. 0.25 ha). This difference is significant 
and holds also in the sub-sample of male-headed households.  
The finding of the importance of relative wealth and landholdings align well with those of Van 
Landeghem et al. (2011) who, studying subjective well-being (SWB) of farm households in the 
context of land reform in Moldova, conclude that:  
… household land holdings have a positive effect on SWB but neighbors’ average 
land holdings have a negative effect on SWB. People, regardless of the land 
distribution and even given the relatively low living standards of these households, 
rate their welfare by looking at how much other people possess.  
The importance of relative wealth for SWB has also been underlined by Fafchamps and Shilpi 
(2008), Kingdon and Knight (2007), and Luttmer (2005), among others. 
                                                 
21 The GHQ has been translated into many languages. It was cross-culturally validated as part of a World Health 
Organization project on mental illness conducted in both developing and developed countries (Goldberg et al. 1997). 
During the preparation phase of the 2008 round of the panel data, we let the GHQ-12 be translated from English to 
Kinyarwanda and then back from Kinyarwanda to English by two different translators (double-blinded). We compared 
the re-translated English version with the original one to spot problems, which were then discussed in detail with both 
translators until a consensus on an accurate translation was reached. We acknowledge input from Pieter Serneels in 
this process. 
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These are merely correlations and future work needs to properly account for confounding factors 
and identify causal relationships. 
3.4 Summary of small panel data analysis 
We measured considerable income growth between 2002 and 2008, despite a strong decline in 
landholdings. Similarly, income inequality remained stable despite a strong increase in land 
inequality. Increases in land productivity as well as income diversification towards the non-farm 
sector may have counterbalanced the effect of declining farm sizes. The more equal distribution 
of livestock that we observed in the data may also have moderated income inequality. 
We noted considerable mobility in income, land and livestock ownership. Self-reported social 
mobility was much lower. In particular, the lowest social category (‘the abject poor’ or Umutindi 
nyakujya) experienced very little upward mobility, while a fair share of the other poor (categories 2 
and 3) reported upward social mobility. 
Changes in production factors (land, labour) were found to be determinants of income mobility. 
Land ownership and land productivity turned up as important factors among the self-reported 
reasons for social mobility, next to support from the authorities, livestock ownership and better 
access to healthcare, among others. 
About one-third of household heads reported being unhappy. Happiness was only weakly related 
to income levels and the household’s current social category, and instead seemed to be driven by 
relative changes in income (both measured and self-reported), as well as levels and changes in land 
ownership.  
Land emerges as an all-important factor in the different parts of this analysis, as is clear from the 
following six points that highlight the main findings of this section: 
– Income increased substantially between 2002-08; 
– Land ownership decreased substantially and became much more skewed; 
– Income mobility was large, while social mobility was much lower; 
– Land emerged as an important determinant of income and income mobility; 
– The top three self-reported reasons for social mobility concerned land and its 
productivity; 
– Land and changes in land were strongly correlated with measure of happiness. 
4 Discussion 
The trends in health and education across the five different DHS rounds indicate progress beyond 
mere post-war catch-up. Furthermore, while the coercive implementation of some policies raises 
concern about ‘cosmetic’ changes, there is robust evidence for real improvements in quality of life 
measures. Finally, converging trends across wealth quintiles in the last three DHS rounds resulted 
in a decline in inequality compared to the pre-war situation.  
A number of factors may account for the real progress in health and education indicators observed 
since 2005: 
First, health expenditure per capita increased by a factor of 2.5 between 2004 and 2010 (Figure 10, 
Panel A) and public health expenditure as a share of government expenditure increased by a factor 
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of 1.6 (from 14.6 per cent to 23.3 per cent) over the same period. Furthermore, the new 
constitution of 2003 introduced free and mandatory primary education. 
The surge in expenditures is partly financed by aid flows to Rwanda that have increased steeply 
and steadily since 2004 to a level twice as high as prior to the war (Figure 10, Panel B). Even when 
accounting for population, the surge in aid flows is substantial, from US$31 per capita in 2004 to 
US$52 per capita in 2010.22 A large part of aid is allocated to the health sector, which received 
more than 30 per cent of all aid flows in 2011, and the social sectors in general, receiving over 50 
per cent.  
The aid flows find reasonably fertile soils in Rwanda, as the worst forms of corruption are kept in 
check and government services are in general technically capable to manage programmes 
effectively (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012).  
One such programme is PBF in healthcare. Introduced in 2006, PBF sets out to improve the 
quality of healthcare delivery by providing financial incentives to health centres. The first 
assessments of PBF are largely positive (Basinga et al. 2010; Meessen et al. 2011). Other scholars 
note that it is difficult to evaluate to what extent progress can be attributed to PBF, and warn 
about the risk of a quality-quantity trade-off (Kalk et al. 2010). 
Also, outside the health sector, increased upward accountability from the local to the central 
government level may have played a role in triggering economic growth and improvements in 
health and education. Since 2006, the local authorities have been required to sign a performance 
contract (Imihigo) with the central government (Ingelaere 2011). The contract acts as a yearly action 
plan, including specific indicators and targets. Every July the results are evaluated during a 
presidential ceremony and broadcasted on radio and television and published in newspapers. To 
the best of our knowledge, there exists no rigorous impact evaluation of Imihigo. 
The Rwandan government also instituted a system of mutual health insurance (MHI), both to 
promote broad access to healthcare and improve the financial situation of health establishments. 
In 2008, MHI was made obligatory for the entire population. The share of households with at least 
one member covered by MHI stood at 78 per cent in 2010, up from 68 per cent in 2007–08. While 
Kalk (2008) asserts that ‘the Mutuelle system corresponds more to an additional tax for health than 
to a proper insurance system’, Saksena et al. (2011) present a positive evaluation of MHI, finding 
MHI coverage to be associated with an increased utilization of health services.  
All these factors may have contributed to the improvements in the selected human development 
indicators, although—in order to firmly establish this—careful impact evaluations are needed.  
In addition, since economic growth was broad-based, it may have increased the ability of 
households to invest in better health, nutrition and education. But the causality runs both ways: 
better health and education are key determinants of an individual’s productivity, and therefore 
likely to lead to higher income. The causation from health to income implies that policies that 
reduce the likelihood of sickness or shorten its duration may narrow income inequalities, provided 
that these policies also benefit the relatively poor in society (Deaton 2003). A similar argument can 
be made for the impact of more equal access to education on income inequality.  
                                                 
22 As the increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA) coincided with a period of rapid economic growth, 
ODA as a share of gross national income declined from 10.6 per cent in 2004 to 9.8 per cent in 2010. 
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Because of this multi-way causation, it is not surprising that the improvements in human 
development as inferred from the DHS data are in line with the poverty and inequality trends that 
emerge from data on consumption expenditures. But how can this evidence of pro-poor growth 
be reconciled with the much more pessimistic findings of mostly qualitative fieldwork at the local 
level?  
This question gave rise to our analysis of dynamic and subjective measures of household well-
being, which relied on a small panel dataset. The response to the question ‘Have you recently been 
feeling reasonably happy all things considered?’ turned out to be unrelated to income levels. 
Instead, ‘happiness’ was found to correlate strongly with relative income changes and landholdings.  
This finding suggests that subjective measures of well-being do not necessarily align well with 
objective measures of well-being; and that the mismatch may be considerable in Rwanda as the 
country embarked on rapid and profound social transformations in the area of politics, justice and 
economics; leading to winners and losers (in relative terms) and affecting the traditional land- and 
subsistence-based livelihoods. I point out some issues that relate to the rapid economic 
transformation.23  
One of the main objectives for change, made explicit in Rwanda’s Vision 2020, is to ‘transform 
agriculture into a productive, high value, market oriented sector, with forward linkages to other 
sectors’ (GoR 2000: 4). In view of this goal, an increasing share of the government budget is 
channeled to agriculture.24 While more funding to the agricultural sector may have accounted for 
rural growth and poverty reduction in recent years, it has also served to implement policies that 
peasants find difficult to adapt to, such as land consolidation and mono-cropping.  
One of the reasons why adaptation to these changes may prove difficult relates to the rapid pace 
of the transformations. It is unlikely that the pace will slow down in the near future, if only because 
Rwanda’s population is very dense and still growing. While the Rwandan population density had 
dropped to 247 inhabitants per km2 by the end of 1994 (from 283 prior to the genocide), with 
refugees returning and fertility remaining high, it quickly bounced back to a density of 322 
inhabitants per km2 in 2002 (GoR 2003). The estimates of the 2012 census point to a population 
density of 416. The projected density for 2012 is 513; while for 2050 it is as high as 861, three 
times as large as on the eve of the genocide (GoR 2009, 2012b). In the face of such population 
densities, subsistence agriculture is a dead-end street and rapid transformations are required. 
One could in fact argue that a lack or too slow pace of transformative changes contributed to the 
violence in Rwanda. Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s demographic pressure did not lead 
to a wide adoption of agricultural innovations. Instead, when all marginal lands were taken up for 
cultivation, it gradually led to a reduction in food production per capita (Clay 1996). A number of 
studies have demonstrated that the deteriorating economic conditions and land scarcity played a 
role in the scale and intensity of the 1994 killings (André and Platteau 1998; Verpoorten 2012b).  
To reduce the burden of rapid population growth on its economy and society, the Rwandan 
government set out to reduce fertility, targeting a total fertility rate (TFR) of 4.5 for 2020 (GoR 
2000). The target was set in 2000, when the TFR stood at 5.8. While fertility first increased to 6.1 
in 2005, it then started a rapid decline to 5.5 in 2007/8 and 4.6 in 2010, very close to the target set 
for 2020. While in part the decline is a continuation of a trend that started in the 1980s and was 
                                                 
23 For transformations in politics and justice I refer to the book edited by Straus and Waldorf (2011). 
24 In 2011/12 the Rwandan government allocated 7 per cent of its national annual budget to the agricultural sector, 
up from 3.5 per cent in 2007 (GoR 2011). 
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interrupted by the violent events, it results to a large extent from active government policy and 
rapid changes in the environment (Westoff 2012). For instance, gender equality was actively 
promoted, both in sensitization campaigns and in legislation; in 2007, Rwanda launched a 
campaign to promote three-children families, and infant and child mortality declined rapidly from 
its high in 2000.25 
The sharp decline in fertility marked the beginning of the last phase of the demographic transition 
for Rwanda. Still, even in a scenario with low fertility, Rwanda’s population will grow to reach over 
20 million by 2050, with a population density of over 800 inhabitants per km2. This will inevitably 
require further transformative changes, bringing about (relative) winners and losers, and the 
grievances that go with that. The probability that grievances escalate is likely to be larger if the 
changes involve coercive measures and the process leading up to the changes is top-down instead 
of being carried by the communities they concern. This brings us to the Achilles heel of the 
Rwandan success story: ‘voice and accountability’.  
Although the technically capable government is well under way to reach several of the Millennium 
Development Goals,26 Rwanda’s path to development remains controversial, because of the sharp 
contrast between the impressive economic progress and the standstill in ‘voice and accountability’, 
one of the six Kaufmann et al. (2010) governance indicators. The allegations made against 
President Kagame and the RPF-led government are not minor, including severe and hardly 
concealed political and societal repression in Rwanda and the fuelling of violence across the border 
with Congo (Reyntjens 2012). These allegations cast a shadow over the regime’s economic 
successes and leave the scholar and donor community deeply divided on how to approach 
Rwanda.27  
While the authoritarian approach may be instrumental in bringing about transformative changes 
without much overt protest, there is a danger that any positive achievement this may yield will be 
undone. A lack of voice and accountability may compromise a level playing field and open 
dialogue, not only leading to economic but also to political grievances. The combination of political 
and economic grievances may lead to a dangerous cocktail, of which the potential impact can 
hardly be ignored in Rwanda, considering the intensity and extent of the 1994 genocide and other 
forms of violence that ravaged the country in the 1990s. Rwanda’s history should make observers 
especially attentive to evolutions in social, political and economic exclusion. This argument is 
further developed in Ingelaere and Verpoorten (2014). 
Taken all together, on the economic front Rwanda is doing more than well. If poverty and 
inequality can be further reduced in the country’s growth process, and relative winners and losers 
do not align with a group identity, economic grievances may be kept in check, perhaps sufficiently 
so to counterbalance political grievances. This is however a dangerous bet, and the first best would 
probably be to aim at an improvement of economic as well as governance indicators.  
                                                 
25 A further decline in the near future is possible. This can be seen from Figure 11. Setting out both the TFR and the 
ideal number of children over time, it shows that the ideal number of children has decreased rapidly over time, and 
stalled at 3.3 in 2007/08 and 2010. As 3.3 is quite a bit lower than the actual fertility at 4.6 in 2010, there still is room 
for further decline, the more so because the gap between TFR and the ideal number of children remains non-negligible, 
at 1.3 (down from 2 in 1992). 
26  See, www.unrwanda.org/undp/rwamdg_indicators.pdf (accessed 3 October 2014). 
27 Following renewed allegations mid-2012 on Rwanda’s role in supporting armed groups in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), some donors pulled out or reduced their effective payments, leading to an estimated 20 per cent 
reduction in Official Donor Assistance in 2012 (World Bank 2013a). 
19 
This research points to the following directions for future research: 
– Rigorous impact evaluations of the different policies and events that may account 
for the progress in health and schooling; 
– A careful study of various subjective measures of well-being and their 
determinants; 
– A thorough analysis of the different agricultural policies, and how they affect land 
and income inequality, and SWB; 
– Research aimed at increasing agricultural productivity of very small landholdings; 
– Research on the capacity of the non-farm sector to absorb more labour, skilled and 
unskilled; 
– A study on the identity of relative winners and losers in the transformative changes. 
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Figure 1: GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international US$)28 
 
Source: World Bank (2013b). 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of DHS rounds, major events and policies 
 
Notes: a Performance-based financing (in healthcare); b Imihigo is a performance contract between each district 
and the central government. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Figure 3: Health and education across DHS rounds, averages for total sample (dotted) and for respondents in the 
lowest (solid) and highest (dashed) wealth quintiles 
                                                 
28 1 PPP dollar (or international dollar) has the same purchasing power in the domestic economy of a country as US$1 
has in the US economy. 
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Notes: NAR = Net attendance ratio. 
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data. 
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Figure 4: Inter-province differences in health and education across DHS rounds 
  
  
  
27 
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data. 
 
Figure 5: Location of sample clusters (on map with old administrative provinces) 
 
Note: The dots on the map indicate the sample clusters. 
Source: DeLorme mapping donated by Response.Net. 
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Figure 6: Kernel density distributions of land and livestock in 2002 and 2008 
  
Source: Small panel dataset. 
 
Figure 7: Scatter plots showing time dependence in material welfare indicators 
  
  
Source: Small panel dataset. 
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Figure 8: Box-and-whisker plots of material welfare by self-reported social categories 
  
  
  
  
Notes: The different categories correspond to the abject poor (Umutindi nyakujya), the very poor (Umutindi), the 
poor (Umukene), the resourceful poor (Umukene wifashije), the food-rich (Umukungu) and the money-rich 
(Umukire). 
Source: Small panel dataset. 
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Figure 9: Self-reported reasons for social mobility 
Reasons for downward mobility Reasons for upward mobility 
  
Source: Small panel dataset. 
 
Figure 10: Health expenditures and overseas development assistance 
Source: The figures on ODA are taken from www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ (accessed 3 June 2013); the figures on 
health expenditures are from World Bank (2013b). 
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Figure 11: TFR versus ideal number of children by year 
 
Source: DHS data. 
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Table 1: Physical capital 
DHS survey round (%) 1992 2000 2005 2007-08 2010 
Housing characteristics       
     Has electricity  2.3 6.2 4.8 6.0 9.7
     Finished floor  11.0 13.1 13.0 14.6 16.9
Household durable goods       
     Radio  32.3 35.2 45.8 58.2 62.6
     Television  n.a. 2.4 2.3 3.4 5.3
     Bicycle  6.4 7.6 11.0 12.2 15.2
     Motorcycle  0.7 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.1
     Pirvate car  0.5 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data. 
 
Table 2: Fertility and reproductive health 
DHS survey round (%) 1992 2000 2005 2007-08 2010
Total fertility ratea 6.2 5.8 6.1 5.5 4.6
Use of contraceptionb       
     Any method  21.2 13.2 17.4 36.4 51.6
     Any modern method 12.9 5.7 10.3 27.4 45.1
     Unmet need for family planning  38.9 35.6 37.9 100.0 20.8
Delivery at health care facilityc 26.3 25.7 29.7 53.7 78.3
Assistance of trained personnel  28.3 31.3 38.6 52.1 69.0
Maternal mortality rated n.a. 1071 750 n.a. 476
Notes: aFor the three years preceding the survey and the percentage of women 15-49 currently pregnant; bAmong 
married women; cOf live births in the last three years preceding the survey; dPer 100,000 live births, for the period 
of 0-4 years prior to the survey. 
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data, except for the fertility and mortality rates which are taken from the 
DHS reports. 
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Table 3: Other health outcomes 
DHS survey round 1992 2000 2005 2007-08 2010
Mortality rate        
     Infant mortality 85 109 83 64 50
     Under-5 mortality 151 196 152 103 76
Nutritional status        
     Height-for-age (% below -2 SD) 56.8 48.3 51.1 n.a. 44.2
     Weight-for-height (% below -2 SD) 5.0 8.3 4.7 n.a. 2.8
     Weight-for-age (% below -2 SD) 24.3 19.5 17.5 n.a. 11.4
Health condition past two weeks (age 0-5)        
      Diarrhoea (%) 22.0 17.2 14.4 13.9 13.3
      Fever (%) 42.1 31.0 26.6 21.9 15.9
All vaccinations (% children 12-23 months) 86.3 76.0 75.2 80.4 90.1
Household owns mosquito net (any type, %) n.a. 6.6 18.2 59.2 82.7
At least one household member has insurance (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 68 78
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data, except for the under-5 mortality rate, nutritional status and health 
insurance which are taken from the DHS reports. 
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Table 4: Educational outcomes 
DHS survey round 1992 2000 2005 2007-08 2010
Educational level       
    No education, men (%, >6 year) 29.4 24.9 19.4 n.a. 13.0
    No education, women (%, >6 year) 40.4 32.6 27.7   n.a.  20.2
    Mean years of education, men 15-65 3.9 4.1 4.1  n.a. 4.6
    Mean years of education, women 15-65 3.0 3.3 3.4  n.a. 4.0
Net attendance ratioa        
     Primary school, total 61.5 72.0 80.6  n.a. 87.5
     Secondary school, total 5.7 4.9 4.0  n.a. 14.4
Gross attendance ratiob        
     Primary school, total 84.6 104.5 134.2 n.a. 142.4
     Secondary school, total 16.6 7.9 8.2 n.a. 26.1
Notes: aThe NAR for primary school is the percentage of the primary school age (7-12 years) population that is 
attending primary school. The NAR for secondary school is the percentage of the secondary school age (13-18 
years) population that is attending secondary school; bThe GAR for primary (secondary) school is the total number 
of primary (secondary) school students, expressed as a percentage of the official primary (secondary) school age 
population. If there are significant numbers of overage and underage students at a given level of schooling, the 
GAR can exceed 100 per cent. 
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data, except for the gross attendance ratio which is taken from the DHS 
reports for 2000, 2005 and 2010, and from the World Development Indicators for 1992. 
 
Table 5: The ratio of indicators between the richest 20% and the poorest 20% of the sample population  
DHS survey round  1992 2000 2005 2007-08 2010
Use of contraceptiona 
Ratio of 
indicator 
between top 
and bottom 
wealth 
quintile 
       
     Any method (%) 1.45 3.26 2.88 1.79 1.32
     Any modern method (%) 1.53 6.19 3.72 1.78 1.29
         
Delivery at healthcare facility (%)b 2.11 3.97 3.36 1.62 1.28
Assistance of trained personnel (%)  1.95 3.08 2.44 1.65 1.40
         
All vaccinations (% children 12-23 months) 1.05 1.08 1.00 1.02 1.10
Household owns mosquito net (any type, %) n.a. 26.01 7.35 1.71 1.20
         
Net attendance ratioc        
     Primary school, total 1.39 1.18 1.10 n.a. 1.19
     Secondary school, total 4.86 12.88 24.24 n.a. 4.74
Notes: aAmong married women; bOf live births in the last three years preceding the survey. cThe NAR for primary 
school is the percentage of the primary school age (7-12 years) population that is attending primary school. The 
NAR for secondary school is the percentage of the secondary school age (13-18 years) population that is attending 
secondary school. 
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data. 
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Table 6: The ratio of indicators between the urban and rural sample population  
DHS survey round  1992 2000 2005 2007-08 2010
Use of contraceptiona 
Ratio of 
indicator 
between 
urban and 
rural 
samples 
       
     Any method (%) 1.36 2.47 2.08 1.28 1.03
     Any modern method (%) 1.57 4.16 2.47 1.39 1.05
         
Delivery at healthcare facility (%)b 2.76 3.51 2.23 1.38 1.12
Assistance of trained personnel (%)  2.61 2.74 1.82 1.42 1.23
         
All vaccinations (% children 12-23 months) 1.08 1.02 0.94 1.00 1.04
Household owns mosquito net (any type, %) n.a. 10.38 2.79 1.19 1.04
         
Net attendance ratioc        
     Primary school, total 1.29 0.55 1.03 n.a. 1.06
     Secondary school, total 3.18 6.24 4.04 n.a. 2.03
Notes: aAmong married women; bOf live births in the last three years preceding the survey; cThe NAR for primary 
school is the percentage of the primary school age (7-12 years) population that is attending primary school. The 
NAR for secondary school is the percentage of the secondary school age (13-18 years) population that is attending 
secondary school. 
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data. 
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Table 7: Summary statistics, 2002–08 
  2002–08 panel, N=241 
  2002 2008
  Mean St.error Mean St.error
Material welfare: Income      
Annual household net income 
(2011 prices, RWF) 217,757 368,995 283,264 332,847 
Annual household net income/aea 
(2011 prices, RWF) 54,614 135,973 60,725 69,412 
Income composition      
Farm wage 7.0% 17.5% 6.2% 17.9%
Non-farm wage 7.2% 19.1% 7.6% 22.9%
Non-farm self 9.4% 22.8% 10.1% 24.9%
Farm self 60.0% 29.4% 56.7% 29.1%
Beer 7.2% 11.6% 6.6% 13.4%
Livestock 10.5% 14.6% 12.6% 19.2%
Material welfare: Assets      
Land size (ares)b 88.9 99.0 53.8 95.5
TLUc 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.2
     Cattle 0.7 1.4 0.9 1.1
     Goats 0.8 1.4 0.9 1.4
     Sheep 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.5
     Pigs 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Household composition      
Household size 4.9 2.4 5.2 2.2
Adult equivalentd 4.5 2.3 4.8 2.1
Dependency ratioe 120.7 104.8 108.5 116.9
Female-headed (%) 49.6% 50.1% 46.5% 50.0%
Household member imprisoned 
(%) 7.4% 26.3% 6.6% 24.9% 
Inequality      
Gini of net income 0.57 0.04 0.57 0.02
Gini of net income/ae 0.56 0.06 0.55 0.02
Gini of land size 0.51 0.02 0.62 0.03
Gini of TLU 0.52 0.02 0.39 0.02
Notes: aae = adult equivalent; bare = equivalent to 100 m2 or 0.01 ha; cOne TLU is 175 kg of life mass. Cattle = 1 
TLU, Pig = 0.25 TLU, Sheep and Goat = 0.15 TLU; dThe adult equivalent is based on the calorie needs of household 
members, depending on their age and sex. The reference is an adult, aged 20-39 years, engaging in moderate 
activities. We took the same values as those used in the IHLSS; eThe dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio 
of dependent over active household members (*100). 
Source: Small panel dataset.  
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Table 8: Inter-temporal quintile transition matrices 
Matrix A: Household income; N=241   Matrix B: Household income/ae  
    Income quintiles in 2008     Income quintiles in 2008 
    1 2 3 4 5   1 2 3 4 5
Income 
quintiles   
in 2002 
1 14 12 13 6 4 
Income 
quintiles   
in 2002 
1 14 10 16 5 4 
  28.6 24.5 26.5 12.2 8.2   28.6 20.4 32.7 10.2 8.2 
2 9 14 9 10 5 2 9 15 9 9 6 
  19.2 29.8 19.2 21.3 10.6   18.8 31.3 18.8 18.8 12.5 
3 13 8 8 13 7 3 8 12 5 11 12 
  26.5 16.3 16.3 26.5 14.3   16.7 25.0 10.4 22.9 25.0 
4 8 8 9 8 15 4 12 7 6 13 10 
  16.7 16.7 18.8 16.7 31.3   25.0 14.6 12.5 27.1 20.8 
5 5 6 9 11 17 5 6 4 12 10 16 
    10.4 12.5 18.8 22.9 35.4    12.5 8.3 25.0 20.8 33.3 
Matrix C: Land ownership  Matrix D: Livestock (TLU)  
    Asset quintiles in 2008   Asset quintiles in 2008 
    1 2 3 4 5   1 2 3 4 5 
Asset 
quintiles   
in 2002 
1 16 12 11 6 4 
Asset 
quintiles   
in 2002 
1 41 13 12 11 12 
  32.7 24.5 22.5 12.2 8.2   46.1 14.6 13.5 12.4 13.5 
2 10 10 8 12 8 2 8 2 8 3 2 
  20.8 20.8 16.7 25.0 16.7   34.8 8.7 34.8 13.0 8.7 
3 10 12 10 9 8 3 7 6 12 6 3 
  20.4 24.5 20.4 18.4 16.3   20.6 17.7 35.3 17.7 8.8 
4 6 9 9 13 11 4 12 4 18 15 6 
  12.5 18.8 18.8 27.1 22.9   21.8 7.3 32.7 27.3 10.9 
5 7 6 10 8 17 5 2 3 3 12 21 
    14.6 12.5 20.8 16.7 35.4     4.9 7.3 7.3 29.3 51.2 
 
Note: Figures in italics denote the row percentages, the other figures are the numbers of households. 
Source: Small panel dataset. 
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Table 9: OLS regression to determine time dependence of material welfare  
Dependent variable: 
end year material 
wealth 
Log income 
2008 
Log 
income/ae 
2008
Log land 
size 2008 
(are)
Log livestock 
2008 (TLU) 
Base year material 
wealth 
   
  
Log income 2002 0.380***    
  (0.079)    
Log income/ae 2002   0.279***   
    (0.086)   
Log land size 2002 
(are)     0.320***  
     (0.096)  
Log livestock 2002 
(TLU)      0.428***
      (0.054)
Constant 7.488*** 7.592*** 1.939*** 0.253** 
  (0.925) (0.914) (0.498) (0.127)
Commune dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 241 241 241 241
R² 0.149 0.114 0.200 0.282
Notes: ae = adult equivalent. are = 100m2 or 0.01 ha. 
Source: Small panel dataset. 
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Table 10: Explaining income and income mobility 
Dependent variable Income 
2002 (log) Income 2008 (log) 
Variables 
      
Land 2002 (log) 0.268***   
  (0.059)   
Labour 2002 (log) 0.838***   
  (0.116)   
Schooling 2002 (log) 0.056   
  (0.064)   
Female head 2002 -0.382***   
  (0.114)   
Land 2008 (log)   0.355***  
    (0.063)  
Labour 2008 (log)   0.628***  
    (0.145)  
Schooling 2008 (log)   0.131  
    (0.092)  
Female head 2008   -0.067  
    (0.198)  
Log income 2002    0.429***
     (0.080)
Land ∆ (log)    0.197***
     (0.060)
Labour ∆ (log)    0.647***
     (0.170)
Schooling ∆ (log)    0.017
     (0.083)
Female head ∆    0.014
     (0.176)
Constant 9.468*** 9.886*** 7.063***
  (0.288) (0.425) (0.942)
      
Commune fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 241 241 241
R2 0.432 0.281 0.243
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Small panel dataset. 
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Table 11: Social categories 
Social category Characteristics 
 
Umutindi nyakujya 
(those in abject 
poverty)  
Those who need to beg to survive. They have no land or
livestock and lack shelter, adequate clothing and food. They
fall sick often and have no access to medical care. Their
children are malnourished and they cannot afford to send
them to school. 
 
Umutindi (the very  
poor)  
The main difference between the umutindi and the umutindi
nyakujya is that this group is physically capable of working
on land owned by others, although they themselves have either 
no land or very small landholdings, and no livestock.
 
Umukene (the poor)  These households have some land and housing. They live on 
What they can eat, even if the food is not very nutritious. 
However,they do not have a surplus to sell in the market, their  
children do not always go to school and they often have no
  access to healthcare.
 
Umukene wifashije 
(the resourceful 
poor)  
This group shares many of the characteristics of the umukene 
but, in addition, they have small ruminants and their children
go to primary school.
 
Umukungu (the food-
rich)  
 
This group has larger landholdings with fertile soil and enough to 
eat. They have livestock, often have paid jobs, and can access 
healthcare. 
 
Umukire (the money-
rich)  
This group has land and livestock, and often has salaried jobs. 
They have good housing, often own a vehicle, and have enough 
money to lend and to get credit from the bank. Many migrate
  to urban centres. 
Source: GoR (2002). 
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Table 12: Distribution across self-reported social categories (2002 and 2008) and material welfare measures by 
social category (2008) 
  2002 2008     
Categories   Nr %
Cum 
% Nr %
Cum 
%
Income/ae 
08 
Land 
08 
(ares)
Livestock 
08 (TLU) 
Female 
head 
08
Umutindi 
nyakujya 
Those in 
abject 
poverty 
7 2.9 2.9 7 2.9 2.9 28,200 17.4 0.2 0.71 
Umutindi The very poor 31 13.0 15.9 27 11.3 14.2 43,743 29.4 0.4 0.56 
Umukene The poor 102 42.7 58.6 88 36.8 51.1 45,511 42.9 0.8 0.51 
Umukene 
wifashije 
The 
resourceful 
poor 
80 33.5 92.1 102 42.7 93.7 76,699 63.1 1.5 0.43 
Umukungu The food-rich 17 7.1 99.2 14 5.9 99.6 82,637 124.5 2.3 0.07 
Umukire The money-rich 2 0.8 100.0 1 0.4 100.0         
Notes: The distribution of 2002 is based on recall information asked in 2008. For the category Umukire no 
summary statistics are displayed because there only is one observation. ae = adult equivalent. are = 100m2 or 
0.01 ha. 
Source: Small panel dataset. 
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Table 13: Mobility matrix of self-reported social categories 
    Categories in 2008
    Umutindi 
nyakujya 
Umutindi Umukene Umukene 
wifashije 
Umukungu Umukire 
C
at
eg
or
ie
s 
in
 2
00
2 
Umutindi nyakujya 
6 0 1 0 0 0 
  
85.7 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Umutindi 
0 19 8 4 0 0 
  
0.0 61.3 25.8 12.9 0.0 0.0 
Umukene 
1 4 70 27 0 0 
  
1.0 3.9 68.6 26.5 0.0 0.0 
Umukene wifashije 
0 4 8 66 2 0 
  
0.0 5.0 10.0 82.5 2.5 0.0 
Umukungu 
0 0 1 5 11 0 
    0.0 0.0 5.9 29.4 64.7 0.0 
  
Umukire 
0 0 0 0 1 1 
   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 
Notes: The different categories more or less correspond to the abject poor (Umutindi nyakujya), the very poor 
(Umutindi), the poor (Umukene), the resourceful poor (Umukene wifashije), the food-rich (Umukungu), and the 
money-rich (Umukire). Figures in italics denote the row percentages, the other figures are the numbers of 
households. 
Source: Small panel dataset. 
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Table 14: Happiness, and mean income, assets and income change by happiness 
Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy all things considered?     Self-
reported 
mobility: 
"Better"  Nr % 
Cum 
% 
Income/ae 
08
Land 08 
(ares)
Livestock 
08 (TLU)
Female 
head 08 
Income 
change 02-
08 
Strongly disagree 29 11.6 11.6 77897 33.33 0.93 0.59 15146 0.21
Disagree 52 20.8 32.4 47820 40.45 0.86 0.51 26078 0.24
Agree 143 57.2 89.6 61961 62.92 1.24 0.46 69011 0.31
Strongly agree 26 10.4 100 70134 81.47 1.39 0.19 183623 0.42
Notes: ae = adult equivalent. are = 100 m2 or 0.01 ha. 
Source: Small panel dataset. 
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Appendix 1: The impact of conflict on schooling 
Education is a stock variable. The impact of armed conflict on education may therefore cast a long 
shadow. For instance, although a large number of students were enrolled in primary school in the 
immediate post-war years (as can be seen from the NAR and GAR in Table 4), the average years 
of schooling remained far below pre-war levels in 2005, and only reached pre-war levels by 2010. 
This is shown in Appendix Figure A1, Panel (a).  
The lower average years of schooling despite higher enrolment is symptomatic of the problem of 
slow grade progression. Panel (b) only considers the student population, depicting the share of the 
student population that completed primary school, showing that many students aged 15-25 in 2005 
still had not completed primary school. These students, who were about 5-15 years old when the 
genocide started, are inflating the GAR for primary schooling. 
Appendix Figure A1: (a) Years of schooling of the population and (b) primary completion of the student population 
  
Notes: Author’s calculations from DHS data. 
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Appendix 2: Inter-provincial differences, rural sample  
Appendix Table 1 
(a) Reproductive health 
  1992 2000 2005 2007 2010 1992 2000 2005 2007 2010
  Use of any method Use of modern method 
                
Butare -0.072** -0.051** -0.010 -0.047 -0.021 -0.060**
-
0.039*** -0.032 -0.059 -0.023
  (0.031) (0.023) (0.026) (0.042) (0.027) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020) (0.038) (0.027)
Byumba 0.044 -0.025 0.015 0.115*** 0.065** 0.053** -0.013 0.006 0.098*** 0.067**
  (0.032) (0.022) (0.025) (0.041) (0.031) (0.026) (0.014) (0.019) (0.038) (0.031)
Cyangugu -0.057* -0.037 0.038 0.041
-
0.190*** -0.039 0.003 0.049** 0.068*
-
0.205***
  (0.033) (0.022) (0.025) (0.040) (0.032) (0.027) (0.014) (0.019) (0.037) (0.032)
Gikongoro 0.039 -0.040* -0.032
-
0.158*** -0.070* 0.034 -0.020 -0.047** 
-
0.113*** -0.088**
  (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.041) (0.040) (0.026) (0.014) (0.019) (0.037) (0.040)
Gisenyi -0.008 
-
0.072*** 0.016 -0.066 -0.065** -0.001 -0.038** 0.012 -0.056
-
0.079***
  (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.041) (0.028) (0.023) (0.015) (0.019) (0.037) (0.028)
Gitarama 0.010 -0.010 0.049* 0.028 0.149*** -0.021 -0.013 0.036* -0.027 0.124***
  (0.028) (0.023) (0.026) (0.041) (0.029) (0.023) (0.014) (0.021) (0.038) (0.029)
Kibungo -0.068** -0.000 0.136*** -0.084** 0.019 -0.024 -0.005 0.012 -0.061* 0.006
  (0.030) (0.023) (0.025) (0.040) (0.027) (0.024) (0.014) (0.020) (0.037) (0.027)
Kibuye -0.022 
-
0.068*** -0.045* -0.081** -0.026 -0.013
-
0.037*** -0.010 -0.088** -0.051
  (0.033) (0.022) (0.025) (0.041) (0.031) (0.027) (0.014) (0.020) (0.038) (0.031)
Ruhengeri 0.066** 
-
0.090*** -0.011 -0.048 0.021 0.053**
-
0.046*** -0.011 -0.027 0.037
  (0.029) (0.022) (0.025) (0.039) (0.028) (0.024) (0.014) (0.020) (0.036) (0.028)
Umutara   
-
0.066*** 0.015 -0.020 -0.028  -0.022 -0.003 -0.011 -0.033
    (0.025) (0.024) (0.039) (0.036)  (0.016) (0.019) (0.036) (0.036)
Constant 0.213*** 0.149*** 0.135*** 0.375*** 0.522*** 0.128*** 0.060*** 0.084*** 0.283*** 0.466***
  (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.028) (0.020) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014) (0.026) (0.020)
                
Obs 3,150 3,831 4,432 2,888 5,788 3,150 3,831 4,432 2,888 5,788
R² 0.012 0.009 0.016 0.021 0.023 0.011 0.007 0.009 0.018 0.024
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  Delivery at health facility Birth assistance by trained personnel
Butare -0.062* 0.028 0.028 -0.008 0.008 0.014 0.089*** 0.148*** 0.063* -0.014
  (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.046) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.036) (0.022)
Byumba 
-
0.110*** -0.012 -0.003 0.079* 0.033 -0.012 -0.008 0.008 0.014 0.011
  (0.035) (0.028) (0.029) (0.047) (0.030) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.035) (0.025)
Cyangugu 
-
0.159*** 0.139*** 0.109*** 0.269*** 0.197***
-
0.118*** 0.167*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.235***
  (0.035) (0.028) (0.030) (0.047) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.035) (0.025)
Gikongoro 
-
0.124*** -0.059** 
-
0.124***
-
0.131***
-
0.113***
-
0.104***
-
0.068*** 
-
0.111*** 
-
0.179***
-
0.175***
  (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.045) (0.038) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.035) (0.033)
Gisenyi 
-
0.166*** -0.029 -0.075** 0.029 -0.062**
-
0.096*** -0.030 -0.027 -0.053 -0.034
  (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.045) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.035) (0.023)
Gitarama 0.024 0.086*** 0.132*** 0.061 0.097*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.187*** 0.024 0.112***
  (0.031) (0.029) (0.033) (0.046) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.036) (0.025)
Kibungo 
-
0.209*** -0.006 
-
0.090*** -0.026 0.045*
-
0.121*** 0.063** 0.171*** 0.029 0.046**
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.045) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.035) (0.022)
Kibuye 
-
0.165*** -0.015 -0.013 0.044 -0.003
-
0.096***
-
0.071*** -0.019 -0.036 0.012
  (0.036) (0.028) (0.031) (0.045) (0.030) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.035) (0.026)
Ruhengeri 
-
0.160*** -0.017 0.029 -0.006 -0.018
-
0.105*** -0.041* 0.022 
-
0.093*** -0.025
  (0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.045) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023)
Umutara   0.076** 0.043 0.041 0.032  0.117*** 0.119*** 0.018 0.031
    (0.032) (0.029) (0.044) (0.036)  (0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.030)
Constant 0.347*** 0.172*** 0.253*** 0.478*** 0.746*** 0.312*** 0.230*** 0.283*** 0.489*** 0.647***
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.031) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.017)
                
Obs 2,870 3,687 4,518 2,504 4,526 4,809 6,183 6,948 4,222 7,777
R² 0.034 0.021 0.028 0.032 0.027 0.026 0.031 0.047 0.037 0.029
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Rural Kigali is base category. 
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data. 
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(b) Preventive healthcare 
  1992 2000 2005 2007 2010   2000 2005 2007 2010 
  Received all vaccinations Household owns bed net 
                      
Butare -0.034 0.157*** 0.083 0.076 -0.060*   -0.079*** 0.093*** -0.046 -0.021 
  (0.054) (0.057) (0.059) (0.062) (0.033)   (0.008) (0.019) (0.031) (0.015) 
Byumba -0.022 0.068 0.015 0.131** -0.031   -0.079*** 0.058*** -0.141*** -0.051*** 
  (0.052) (0.057) (0.054) (0.062) (0.039)   (0.009) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) 
Cyangugu -0.035 0.110* -0.038 0.089 -0.201***   -0.060*** 0.144*** -0.069** 0.093*** 
  (0.052) (0.059) (0.055) (0.062) (0.037)   (0.009) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) 
Gikongoro 0.047 0.197*** 0.124** 0.041 -0.009   -0.093*** -0.047*** -0.129*** -0.161*** 
  (0.057) (0.063) (0.054) (0.060) (0.048)   (0.009) (0.018) (0.030) (0.022) 
Gisenyi -0.075 0.131** -0.112** 0.157*** -0.187***   -0.096*** -0.019 -0.241*** -0.104*** 
  (0.048) (0.064) (0.054) (0.057) (0.035)   (0.009) (0.018) (0.030) (0.016) 
Gitarama -0.017 0.215*** 0.082 -0.012 -0.020   -0.078*** 0.099*** -0.002 0.056*** 
  (0.047) (0.060) (0.062) (0.059) (0.037)   (0.008) (0.018) (0.031) (0.016) 
Kibungo -0.117** 0.048 -0.103* 0.070 -0.071**   -0.054*** 0.024 0.045 0.080*** 
  (0.049) (0.058) (0.057) (0.061) (0.033)   (0.008) (0.018) (0.031) (0.015) 
Kibuye -0.091* 0.112* 0.159*** 0.115* -0.081**   -0.098*** 0.054*** -0.090*** -0.112*** 
  (0.049) (0.060) (0.056) (0.060) (0.037)   (0.009) (0.018) (0.031) (0.018) 
Ruhengeri -0.025 0.082 0.104* 0.049 -0.042   -0.095*** -0.050*** -0.107*** -0.145*** 
  (0.051) (0.063) (0.054) (0.061) (0.035)   (0.008) (0.018) (0.030) (0.016) 
Umutara   0.018 -0.029 0.028 -0.019   -0.054*** 0.082*** -0.035 0.066*** 
    (0.064) (0.054) (0.057) (0.045)   (0.009) (0.017) (0.030) (0.022) 
Constant 0.900*** 0.658*** 0.738*** 0.730*** 0.971***   0.099*** 0.107*** 0.648*** 0.843*** 
  (0.033) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.025)   (0.006) (0.013) (0.021) (0.011) 
                      
Obs 843 988 1,316 916 1,389   7,622 8,165 5,549 10,530 
R² 0.016 0.024 0.043 0.017 0.045   0.029 0.029 0.024 0.049 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Rural Kigali is base category. 
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data. 
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(c) Education 
  1992 2000 2005 2010 1992 2000 2005 2010
  NAR primary NAR secondary
               
Butare -0.004 -0.062** -0.063** -0.012 0.017 0.003 0.000 -0.011
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017)
Byumba 0.056* -0.030 0.027 0.013 -0.021 -0.011 -0.014 -0.013
  (0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019)
Cyangugu -0.016 0.082*** -0.060*** 0.021 0.012 0.008 -0.022** -0.011
  (0.030) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020)
Gikongoro 0.072** -0.028 -0.004 -0.013 0.017 0.011 -0.022** -0.008
  (0.031) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.024)
Gisenyi -0.026 0.057** 0.014 -0.021 -0.012 -0.031*** -0.023** 0.037**
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018)
Gitarama 0.014 0.116*** 0.056** 0.029* 0.004 -0.015 -0.005 0.022
  (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019)
Kibungo -0.066** -0.097*** -0.043* 0.001 0.004 0.008 -0.015 -0.003
  (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017)
Kibuye -0.052* 0.051** -0.063*** -0.038** -0.028* -0.032*** -0.018* -0.037*
  (0.030) (0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020)
Ruhengeri 0.029 0.066*** 0.024 0.051*** -0.008 -0.027*** 0.010 0.012
  (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018)
Umutara   0.087*** -0.377*** 0.013  -0.025** -0.004 -0.026
    (0.027) (0.023) (0.021)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.024)
Constant 0.608*** 0.677*** 0.834*** 0.865*** 0.052*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.128***
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013)
               
Obs 4,993 6,857 6,612 8,383 3,643 5,697 5,545 6,681
R² 0.006 0.020 0.080 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.004
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Rural Kigali is base category. 
Source: Author’s calculations from DHS data. 
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Appendix 3: Going further back in time 
The panel dataset includes three rounds of data from surveys implemented in 1990, 2002 and 2008 
in two Rwandan provinces, Gikongoro and Gitarama. 
The first round of the dataset was collected in 1990 by the Division of Agricultural Statistics of 
Rwanda’s Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, in collaboration with Michigan State University. 
It was designed as a national farm survey, covering a nationwide random sample of 1,248 farm 
households, and collecting information on subsistence production, crop sales, livestock 
production, non-farm income, beer brewing, transfers, land area, household composition and 
schooling. 
The second round was collected in 2002 as part of a study for DGOS (Belgian Development 
Cooperation). Because of financial constraints, this round was limited to the 256 households 
initially surveyed in the provinces of Gitarama and Gikongoro. The questions asked were 
comparable to those of the 1990 survey. Additionally, recall information was collected about war-
related shocks, other adverse income shocks, and household consumption shortfalls, among 
others.  
Owing to attrition and missing variables for some households, the 2002 survey round includes 
complete information for only 188 households among the 256 households that were originally 
surveyed in 1990. Attrition is a common caveat of panel data, but in this case, the dropout of 
households was especially high because of the killings and population displacement. As attrition 
was high, and especially so among Tutsi-headed households, it was decided to add Tutsi-headed 
households by oversampling them in the second round (2002), lifting their share from less than 10 
per cent to 22.5 per cent (59/258) (Verpoorten and Berlage 2007). 
The third round was collected in 2008 on a grant from the Rwandan government. It relied on a 
survey design similar to that used in the previous two rounds and set out to interview the 258 
households who were interviewed in 2002 (of which 188 were also interviewed in 1990). As the 
country was largely stable between the second and third rounds, attrition was much lower this 
time. Four of the 258 households interviewed in 2002 could not be found, while 13 households 
could not be considered as the same because all former household members had been replaced by 
distant family or by neighbours. 
In our panel data analysis of the period 2002–08, we consider the 241 remaining households. 
Among these households, 176 were also interviewed in 1990. Using a pre-war wave of the panel 
data allows us to assess to what extent growth is catch-up. 
Appendix Table A2 gives the summary statistics for the 176 households that were included in all 
three rounds. The numbers show that the average net income per adult equivalent was very similar 
in 1990 and 2002, at approximately RWF 48,000, but then rose by about 25 per cent to 60,985 
RWF in 2008, corresponding to an average annual growth of 4.0 per cent between 2002 and 2008. 
Both land ownership and livestock ownership decreased between 1990 and 2002. Livestock 
ownership recovered a bit by 2008, but the decline in landownership continued and even 
accelerated; from 97.0 areas in 1990 to 86.6 areas in 2002 and further down to 51.6 areas in 2008. 
In terms of income composition, the contribution of non-farm employment to income increased 
over time from 2.0 per cent in 1990 to 6.8 per cent in 2008 for non-farm wage employment and 
from 6.9 per cent to 10.4 per cent for non-farm self-employment. Most of this increase took place 
during the first sub-period (1990–2002). The contribution of income from livestock increased 
from 7.2 per cent in 1990 to 12.1 per cent in 2008, while the contribution from agricultural 
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production declined from 69.9 per cent to 55.0 per cent. The latter trend is on par with the decline 
in land owned. 
The proportion of female-headed households stood at 17 per cent in 1990 but increased to over 
40 per cent in 2002 and remained high in 2008.  
In 1990, income and land inequality were relatively low at 0.39 and 0.44 respectively, compared to 
0.50 and 0.52 in 2002, and 0.55 and 0.61 in 2008. The fast increasing inequality in land is part of a 
trend that started in the pre-war years. It corresponds to the results of Clay and Kampayana (1997) 
and André and Plateau (1998), which indicate that inequality in Rwanda had been on the rise since 
the mid-1980s and increased rapidly in the period leading up to the genocide. 
In sum, while income levels in 2002 were very similar to 1990—which is an achievement 
considering the wartime shocks—income levels in 2008 stood much higher than their pre-war 
levels. Growth in 2002–08 was therefore not mainly catch-up in this sample. Compared to 1990, 
income inequality however increased considerably.  
Appendix Table A2: Summary statistics 
  1990/2002/2008 panel, N=176 
  1990 2002 2008 
  Mean St.Dev. Mean  St.error Mean  St.error 
Material welfare: Income             
Annual household net income 
(2011 prices, RWF) 196,825 143,757 208,535 307,556 289,340 344,851 
Annual household net income/aea 
(2011 prices, RWF) 47,268 37,289 48,223 55,539 60,985 69,855 
Income composition             
Farm wage 7.7% 14.4% 8.7% 19.6% 7.2% 19.4% 
Non-farm wage 2.0% 7.8% 8.1% 19.8% 6.8% 20.7% 
Non-farm self 6.9% 16.6% 7.9% 20.0% 10.2% 25.1% 
Farm self 69.9% 21.5% 59.3% 28.9% 55.0% 28.8% 
Beer 6.3% 8.6% 8.1% 12.5% 6.9% 13.4% 
Livestock 7.2% 9.7% 9.3% 12.9% 12.1% 18.6% 
Material welfare: Assets             
Land size (ares)b 97.0 87.5 86.6 99.9 51.6 88.2 
TLUc 1.0 1.4 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.2 
     Cattle 0.8 1.3 0.7 1.4 0.9 1.0 
     Goats 0.8 1.4 0.8 1.4 0.9 1.3 
     Sheep 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.5 
     Pigs 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 
Household composition             
Household size 5.4 2.3 5.1 2.4 5.3 2.2 
Adult equivalentd 4.8 2.1 4.7 2.3 4.9 2.1 
Dependency ratioe 108.1 88.4 121.1 101.5 114.2 119.0 
Female-headed (%) 17.0% 37.7% 41.5% 49.4% 40.3% 49.2% 
Household member imprisoned 
(%)     7.4% 0.262 6.3% 0.243 
Inequality             
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Gini of net income 0.36 0.02 0.52 0.04 0.58 0.02 
Gini of net income/ae 0.39 0.02 0.50 0.03 0.55 0.02 
Gini of land size 0.44 0.02 0.52 0.03 0.61 0.03 
Gini of TLU 0.48 0.03 0.53 0.03 0.39 0.02 
Notes: aae = adult equivalent; bare = 100 m2 or 0.01 ha; cOne TLU is 175 kg of life mass. Cattle = 1 TLU, Pig = 
0.25 TLU, Sheep and Goat = 0.15 TLU; dThe adult equivalent is based on the calorie needs of household members, 
depending on their age and sex. The reference is an adult, aged 20-39 years, engaging in moderate activities; eThe 
dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio of dependent over active household members (*100). 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
Appendix 4: Calculating income, land ownership and livestock ownership 
Expenditures are the preferred measure of material welfare but, because of lack of data, we use 
income as a measure of household welfare. The use of income rather than expenditures may 
overstate the extent of economic mobility, especially in a predominantly agricultural setting, in 
which income varies greatly from year to year and households try to smooth consumption across 
years. In addition, measuring income is prone to errors, for example because of the difficulty of 
accounting correctly for the value of subsistence production. Given these drawbacks, we also look 
at asset ownership. In general, physical assets are measured with less error and are indicators of 
the long-run economic status of households.  
To measure income, we use information on five income sources: subsistence agriculture, crop 
sales, beer brewing, livestock production and off-farm earnings.29 We calculated gross income by 
taking the sum over the monetary values of these different income sources.30 To obtain net 
income, we subtracted the cost of hiring in casual labour and of the inputs needed for beer brewing. 
We did not have satisfactory data on other agricultural inputs. However, the net income measure 
is likely to be a good approximation since farming in Rwanda is still overwhelmingly traditional, 
relying almost exclusively on manure for fertilizing the soil and on small hand implements (hoes 
and machetes) for most tasks.  
To calculate monetary values of subsistence agriculture and livestock production, we used prices 
at the provincial level, except for beer and crop sales, for which we could use the prices reported 
by the household. The general price level rose by a factor of 3 between 1990 and 2002 (GoR 
                                                 
29 Ideally, we should also include income from transfers. However, this information is only available for the 1990 
survey. Leaving out transfers may result in a biased income measure. Such a bias is likely to be small since transfers 
are the least important income source. In the 1990 survey, transfers made up only 3 per cent of total income. 
30 It is not clear how best to include livestock production in income. The return on livestock may be in the form of 
manure, meat, milk, eggs and offspring. Besides, households may sell livestock. In Rwanda, livestock is kept largely 
for its manure. The use of manure increases land productivity, and consequently this livestock return is captured by 
the income from subsistence agriculture and crop sales. Livestock is hardly ever kept for meat consumption, because 
most rural Rwandans are too poor to consume sizeable amounts of meat (Kangasniemi 1998). However, selling eggs 
or milk contributes to cash income. Therefore, we included the revenue from eggs and milk sales in livestock income. 
Including the receipts from livestock sales in revenue is problematic because livestock sales are rare and irregular. The 
estimated income would be highly dependent on whether households happened to sell livestock during a period. An 
alternative approach is to assume that the income from livestock is proportional to the value of livestock holdings 
(Kangesniemi 1998). We applied this method. The proportionality factor we use is the calculated average probability 
of selling cattle. 
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2005),31 and by a factor of 1.8 between 2002 and 2008 (IMF World Economic Outlook).32 
Therefore, to obtain income in prices of 2008, we multiplied the incomes of 1990 and 2002 by 5.4 
and 1.8, respectively.  
The two most important assets for Rwandan rural households are livestock (cattle, goats, sheep 
and pigs) and land. We consider both the total land area cultivated and owned. The information 
on the different types of livestock is pooled into an index, based on weights equal to the TLU.33  
 
 
                                                 
31 McKay and Loveridge (2005) report price levels of 106.7 in 1990 and 348.4 in 2000 compared to the base year 1989 
(price index in 1989 = 100). Information on the consumer price index for the period 1999–2005, published by the 
Government of Rwanda on their website, indicates that, after a slight increase in 2001, the price level in 2002 was 
again at its 2000 level. Inflation for the period 1990–2002 would therefore be more or less 328 per cent. Since a 
considerable part of this increase is due to increased prices for housing, water, electricity, gas and other mostly urban 
consumption goods, this price index is likely to overestimate inflation in rural areas. Therefore, although somewhat 
arbitrary, we adjust it downwards to 300 per cent for our sample. 
32 See, http://knoema.com/IMFWEO2013Apr (accessed 4 June 2013). 
33 One TLU is 175 kg of life mass. Cattle = 1 TLU, Pig = 0.25 TLU, Sheep and Goat = 0.15 TLU. 
